

Piracy & Terrorism – A 2 headed Hydra?

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Today's Paper

- Links between Piracy & Terrorism and impact on Security
- Maritime Economy & Globalisation
- Strategic Environment
- 4 P's of Maritime Security
- International Failure & Areas of Weakness
- Way Ahead
- Conclusion

The nature of the threat

Non state terrorism

Proliferation of WMD

Illegal smuggling (weapons and people)

Piracy and Robbery at sea

Asymmetric Warfare (state and non-state actors)

Narcotics & Narco-terrorism

Those who threaten today's maritime security are:

- Highly organised, agile and intelligent
- Hybrid adversaries not other states – those with a big fear of China should read Sun Tzu
- Role of Non-state actors ever more important
- Worrying nexus between terrorism and organised crime e.g. Somalia
- Promotes a worrying climate of... “My enemy's enemy is my friend”

But to counter the above requires all the tools of government and industry. They co-operate effectively and so must we! But we don't we are hamstrung by bureaucracy, profit margin and politics. Look at failure of Western Governments to cooperate or deliver comprehensive approach




Of-Forgotten Economic Argument

- Transport Canada have recognised the problems of disunity in government – advocates of Maritime Commerce Resumption Strategy
- Impact of closing Vancouver (100) or Montreal (60) is measured in \$ millions per day
- Look at Long Beach closure – impact on GM and Wal-Mart was measured in months



The dichotomy of Globalisation



Multi-faceted maritime insecurity



Today's strategic environment seriously threatens maritime security

- Increasing religious, ethnic, social and cultural unrest (Libya, Egypt and Bahrain)
- Increasing illegal immigration
- Increasing competition for natural resources
- Impact of Natural Disasters (Japan, Australia)
- Repressed historic enmities
- Rise of Organised Crime, Hybrids and Non-State Terrorism
- Asymmetric Warfare – State and Non-State
- Yet conventional state on state never quieter!

Reus Smit (04) - Engage with the world and deal with the underlying sources of insecurity and alienation



Our Conventional Response (1) Protecting a regulated ocean commons...

- Failure of the international maritime response off Somalia
 - Art 100 UNCLOS
- Irresistible resource pressure on UNCLOS
- Proliferation of Piracy, Drugs, WMD all require a response but lack of units hampers efforts
- Political impact of sending a platform is more important capability & NATO Soft Option
- Cost of technology chasing partial sea-control is breaking Navy



Our Conventional Response (2) Promoting good

- Regional development is at core of 3-D Security
- Small training teams Vs.. High Tech frigates
- Enduring presence Vs. passing visits HMCS Fredericton & Libya
- Lessons Learned? from Haiti
- Realising you can go from Permissive to Hostile in one riot / take down
- International Relations is a slower kettle
- Navies haven't or won't learn lessons from IQ or AF



Our Conventional Response (3) Preventing conflict

- Does not require a Naval Task-group – big ships need big protection
- Mission Analysis should shape response
- Those tasks associated with Constabulary Roles do not need a Frigate
 - i. Widespread disorder and criminality ashore
 - ii. Asymmetric Action
 - iii. Lack of balance in fleet leads to inflexibility of response
 - iv. Response should mirror political will & culture - e.g. sort out ROE before sailing



Our Conventional Response (4) Prevailing in combat

- “Some advanced technologies will remain essential” within balanced force structure and hybrid capabilities but ...
- Learn lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan – Technology is only of limited benefit & Failure to address socio-economic conditions will defeat you
- NB For the Pirates and Terrorists

Survival = Victory



Maritime Security's operational over-lap

The Current Position



Journey's End –
Comprehensive Approach



Summary: A military option is only part of the solution



A war on terror is not a military exercise. It is a political, diplomatic, economic and social exercise in which military force must always be available and occasionally used.

John Scott Cowan (2006)

Has this been applied to Somalia, Gulf of Guinea? No

Conclusion – who says you can't learn from history?

“We hold that our strategy does not embrace purely military affairs. War must be comprehensive and combined strategy.”

Mao(1958)

“The future is not the son of Desert Storm, but the stepchild of Somalia and Chechnya.”

General C Krulak USMC (1999)

But have we learnt these lessons or are we even capable of learning them?

