Captain Andy Cook’s paper at Global Compass International Maritime Forum Varna Bulgaria 8/9 September 2026
1. Key Message
Shipping is becoming highly digitalised, automated and connected, but technology does not remove human responsibility. Risk will still need to be managed. The future of safe shipping depends on giving seafarers the competence, authority, situational awareness and support to understand, challenge and intervene when technology does not behave as required.
2. The Challenge
The maritime industry is changing on several fronts simultaneously. Geopolitical instability and security threats are increasing operational complexity; decarbonisation is introducing new fuels and systems; automation and artificial intelligence are changing how ships are operated; connectivity is creating both opportunity & cyber exposure; and regulatory & administrative demands continue to grow.
The important point from the shipmaster’s perspective is that none of these developments removes the human element. They make it more important.
A shipmaster is increasingly responsible for managing a complex socio-technical system in which people, software, sensors, communications, procedures and machinery must work together. The regulatory landscape is also moving rapidly. In May 2026, the International Maritime Organization adopted the first global International Code of Safety for Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS Code), which took effect on 1 July 2026. The Code addresses the safe integration of remotely controlled and autonomous commercial ships and recognises the need to consider roles and responsibilities, operation, training and human involvement. IFSMA sat on the IMO Working Group that developed the MASS Code. (International Maritime Organization (Visit external site. Link opens in a new tab.))
The challenge, therefore, is not simply how to automate shipping. It is how to ensure that the human being ultimately responsible for safety remains capable of making the right decision when the unexpected happens.
3. Key Insight
My central observation is straightforward: automation does not remove risk — it changes where the risk sits.
The progression from conventional operation through increasing automation, remote operation and ultimately autonomous operation, raises the same fundamental question at every stage: where does responsibility sit, and does the person carrying that responsibility still have the authority and competence to act?
The new MASS Code provides an important regulatory milestone. IMO describes it as a goal-based framework intended to support the safe integration of remotely controlled and autonomous commercial ships while maintaining safety, security and environmental protection standards equivalent to those expected of conventional ships. It also requires different modes of operation to be identified and addresses the roles and responsibilities of masters, remote operators and onboard personnel according to the level of autonomy. (International Maritime Organization (Visit external site. Link opens in a new tab.))
From an IFSMA perspective, this leads to a critical principle: if we retain the master’s responsibility, we must also retain the master’s authority, competence, understanding and ability to intervene.
There is a paradox at the heart of automation. The better an automated system becomes, the less frequently a human may need to intervene. Yet when intervention is finally required, the circumstances may be more complex and the consequences more serious.
Three risks follow.
First is skill degradation. If a system performs a task successfully almost all the time, how do we maintain the human’s ability to perform that task when the system fails?
Second is automation bias or complacency. When a machine appears confident, will the human challenge its recommendation when circumstances suggest that it is wrong?
Third is loss of situational awareness. Can the person supervising the system genuinely understand what it is doing, why it is doing it and what its limitations are?
This changes the question we should ask about artificial intelligence. It should not simply be whether AI can make a better decision than a human. The more important question is whether the human understands enough about the AI’s decision to accept it, reject it or override it.
Competence therefore has to evolve with technology. Shipmasters and Deck Officers need experience not only with traditional navigation but also with decision-support systems, autonomous functions and AI-generated information. Engineer Officers increasingly need knowledge of software, sensors, networks, automation and cyber-physical systems. And all seafarers need stronger understanding of cybersecurity and human factors.
Training must consequently cover automation management, monitoring, intervention and takeover, degraded modes, human-machine interfaces, fatigue, workload and decision-making under uncertainty.
Finally, technological progress must not be confused with human wellbeing. Technology may reduce workload while increasing cognitive workload. Connectivity can reduce isolation while simultaneously creating an expectation of being permanently connected to shore. A technologically advanced ship is not necessarily a psychologically healthy ship.
4. From Vision to Action
The responsibility for creating a human-centred future for shipping is shared. Regulators such as IMO and flag state administrations, classification societies, shipowners, operators, technology developers, training organisations and seafarers themselves all have a role.
Regulators should ensure that new frameworks for autonomous and remotely operated ships are matched by clear definitions of responsibility, authority, competence and intervention. The MASS Code is an important beginning, but its experience-building phase should be used to identify where rules, training standards and operational assumptions need further development. IMO itself describes the current Code as non-mandatory and intends the experience-building process to inform development of a future mandatory framework. (International Maritime Organization (Visit external site. Link opens in a new tab.))
Shipowners and operators should stop treating training as something that follows technology. Competence needs to be designed alongside the technology. Before introducing increasingly autonomous functions, operators should identify what the human is expected to do during normal operation, degraded operation and emergency intervention — and then train accordingly.
Technology developers have an equally important responsibility. Systems should be designed around the human who has to supervise, understand and, when necessary, override them. Interfaces should communicate uncertainty and limitations rather than simply present an apparently authoritative answer. Automation should support professional judgement rather than encourage passive acceptance.
Training institutions should develop a new competence model for the future shipmaster and chief engineer. Simulator-based training should expose seafarers to automation failures, degraded communications, conflicting information, cyber disruption and situations in which the correct response depends upon recognising that an automated recommendation is wrong.
Finally, responsibility must be matched by resources. It is not enough to tell a master that they remain ultimately responsible. They must have the people, information, training, equipment, communications and authority required to discharge that responsibility.
The objective should not be to make the human irrelevant. It should be to make the human more capable.
That means designing technology, regulation and training around the reality of maritime operations: when the unexpected happens — and at sea, it always does — someone must understand the situation, understand the consequences and have both the competence and authority to act.
5. Three Actionable Takeaways
What should change?
Design automation around human capability, not human replacement. Every new system should explicitly identify the human role, intervention points, failure modes and information required for safe decision-making.
Who should act?
Regulators, shipowners, technology developers and training providers must act together. No single organisation can create a safe autonomous operating environment because responsibility, technology, competence and regulation are inseparable.
What can be achieved?
A future-ready maritime workforce can be created without being anti-technology. With appropriate training, authority and human-centred design, digitalisation can make seafarers more capable, improve safety and support more resilient operations.